Garcia Maria De La Luz v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-16-2014 
Garcia Maria De La Luz v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Garcia Maria De La Luz v. Attorney General United States" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 979. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/979 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-3293 
______________ 
 
GARCIA GAYOLLO MARIA DE LA LUZ, 
a/k/a Maria De La Luz Garcia Gayosso, 
a/k/a Norma Rodriguez-Acevedo, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(B.I.A. No. A200-688-646) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Charles M. Honeyman 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  September 16, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Maria De La Luz Garcia Gayosso (“Petitioner”) petitions for review of 
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an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s 
(“IJ’s”) determination that Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.   
I 
As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of two counts 
of forgery in the third degree for altering a document in violation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 
11, § 861(b)(3), and was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and a term of 
supervision.1  The Department of Homeland Security then charged Petitioner under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien who entered the United States without being 
admitted or paroled.  Before the IJ, Petitioner conceded her inadmissibility but sought 
cancellation of her removal.  The Government filed a motion to pretermit Petitioner’s 
application on the ground that Petitioner had been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude, which the IJ granted.  The BIA affirmed.  Petitioner now petitions for review.  
II2 
                                                 
1 The charges stemmed from Petitioner’s use of a stolen Social Security card that  
had been altered.   
2 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s orders pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).    
We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, except when Chevron v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), requires that we defer to the BIA.  Denis v. Att’y 
Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2011).  We defer under Chevron “when an agency 
construes or interprets a statute that it administers” and the agency’s interpretation is 
“based on a permissible interpretation of the statute.”  Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 
87 (3d Cir. 2004).  We therefore defer to the BIA’s definition of moral turpitude and its 
determination that a certain crime involves moral turpitude.  Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 
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A noncitizen who is subject to removal bears the burden of establishing her 
eligibility for discretionary cancellation of removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i).  To 
meet this burden, she must demonstrate that (1) she “has been physically present in the 
United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years;” (2) she “has been a 
person of good moral character during such period;” (3) she “has not been convicted of 
an offense under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3);” and (4) “removal would 
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or 
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).   
Our inquiry focuses on the third element—whether Petitioner’s forgery conviction 
qualifies as an offense under §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3).  Because we 
conclude that Petitioner’s forgery conviction is an offense under § 1227(a)(2), we need 
not consider whether it also qualifies as an offense under §§ 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(3).  
Section 1227(a)(2) pertains to offenses in which an alien “(I) is convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude . . . and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence 
of one year or longer may be imposed . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); see also 
Cortez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 301, 307 (BIA 2010).  The statute does not define “moral 
turpitude,” but our Court has described “[m]orally turpitudinous conduct [a]s inherently 
base, vile, or depraved; contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed 
                                                                                                                                                             
F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008).  “No deference, however, is given to the BIA’s parsing of 
the elements of the underlying crime.”  Id. 
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other persons, either individually or to society in general.”  Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 275.  
The “hallmark” of moral turpitude is a “reprehensible act committed with an appreciable 
level of consciousness or deliberation,” and the general rule is that “evil intent is a 
requisite element.”  Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 413-14 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Therefore, to “determine whether a particular 
crime involves moral turpitude, we ask whether the criminal act [covered by the criminal 
statute] is ‘accompanied by a vicious motive of a corrupt mind.’”  Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 
275-76.  Hence, we focus on “the criminal statute and the record of conviction, not the 
alien’s conduct.”  Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411.   
 In this case, Petitioner was convicted of altering a document in violation of Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 861(a)(1) and (b)(3).  The statute provides that a “person is guilty of 
forgery when, intending to defraud, deceive or injure another person, or knowing that the 
person is facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the person . . . [a]lters 
any written instrument of another person without the other person’s authority.”  Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 861(a)(1).  The statute’s requirement that the offender have either 
intent to defraud or knowledge she is facilitating a fraud is sufficient to render the crime 
morally turpitudinous because fraud is “universally recognized” as a crime involving 
moral turpitude. 3  Doe v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 266, 270 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Jordan 
                                                 
3 Petitioner advances arguments premised on the notion that she was convicted of 
mere possession of altered documents under § 861(a)(3).  The record of conviction 
specifies, however, that she was convicted of altering documents, which is an offense 
under § 861(a)(1).  We therefore need only consider whether altering documents in 
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v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (“[F]raud has consistently been regarded as such 
a contaminating component in any crime that American courts have, without exception, 
included such crimes without the scope of moral turpitude.”).4  
 Additionally, Petitioner’s forgery conviction satisfies § 1227(a)(2)’s requirement 
that the crime be eligible for a sentence of “one year or longer,” as individuals convicted 
of forgery in violation of § 861(b)(3) may receive sentences of “up to 1 year 
incarceration.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4206(a).  Therefore, Petitioner’s forgery 
conviction qualifies as an offense under § 1227(a)(2), and the BIA correctly determined 
that she is not eligible for cancellation of removal.  
                                                                                                                                                             
violation of § 861(a)(1) is a crime involving moral turpitude.  Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 275 
(“When a statute is ‘divisible,’ meaning that it prohibits several different types of 
conduct, we ‘look to the record of conviction to determine whether the alien was 
convicted under a part of the statute which defines a crime involving moral turpitude.”) 
(internal citations and alterations omitted).  Moreover, our result would be the same even 
if Petitioner had been convicted of possessing documents under § 861(a)(3) because that 
offense also requires intent to defraud or knowledge she is facilitating a fraud.  See 
Omagash v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 261 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We find reasonable the BIA’s 
decision to classify, as moral turpitude, conspiracy to possess illegal immigration 
documents with the intent to defraud the government.”) (emphasis omitted); Lagunas-
Salgado v. Holder, 584 F.3d 707, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that transfer of an 
identification document knowing that it was stolen or produced without lawful authority 
was a crime of moral turpitude and distinguishing it from a crime for “mere[] 
possessi[on]” that “contained no requirement or proof that a document was used or was 
intended to be used in an unlawful manner”).  
4 Petitioner contends that forgery under Delaware law does not involve moral 
turpitude because it is broader than the definition of forgery under federal law.  In 
particular, she argues that she could not have been convicted of forgery under federal law 
because she used a “genuine” document that had been altered and according to Petitioner, 
forgery under federal law pertains only to documents that were fraudulently created.  
Whether her conduct is also criminal under federal law, however, is immaterial for our 
purposes of determining whether her state conviction is for a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  See Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 276-79. 
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III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition. 
